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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CRIMINAL LAW: Are Indian Tribal Courts and Federal District
Courts "Arms of Different Sovereigns" for Purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause? Two Views
In United States v. Wheeler, 545 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1976), the
defendant, a Navajo Indian, entered a plea of guilty before the
Navajo Tribal Court to charges of contributing to the delinquency
of a minor and disorderly conduct. The charges stemmed from a
sexual incident which transpired on the reservation. More than a
year later defendant was indicted in federal court and charged
with carnal knowledge of a female Indian under the age of sixteen
years. It was not disputed that the federal charge grew out of the
same incident and charge presented to the Navajo Tribal Court.
Prior to trial, the federal district court dismissed the indictment on
the ground that defendant had been previously placed in jeopardy
for the same offense. There was a government appeal from that
dismissal. The issue on appeal was whether Indian tribal courts
and federal district courts are "arms of different sovereigns" for
purposes of the double jeopardy clause. The Ninth Circuit held
that Indian tribal courts and the United States district courts are
not arms of separate sovereigns and affirmed the holding of the
district court.
In United States v. Walking Crow, No. 77-1136 (8th Cir.,
August 10, 1977), the defendant, a member of the Rosebud Sioux
Tribe, entered a plea of guilty before the Tribal Court to a charge
of simple theft. These charges stemmed from an incident involving
another member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe. In March, 1977,
Walking Crow was indicted by the Federal Grand Jury for the
District of South Dakota for the crime of robbery under the Major
Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 1153, in connection with 18 U.S.C. 2111,
which defines the offense of robbery when committed within the
special territorial jurisdiction of the United States. A motion to
dismiss was filed by the appellant, stating as a ground therefor
that because he had been convicted of theft in Tribal Court and
because the theft and the alleged robbery he was now being in-
dicted for arose out of the same incident, the felony prosecution in
the United States district court was prohibited by the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment as tribal courts are arms of
the same sovereign as United States district courts. The motion
was denied and after a nonjury trial appellant was found guilty
and sentenced to a three-year term of imprisonment.
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Taking notice of the fact that appellant's position was fully sus-
tained by United States v. Wheeler, 545 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1976),
pet. for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L. W. 3826 (U.S. June 21, 1977) (No.
76-1629), the Eighth Circuit said, "With all due respect to that
court, we disagree with its holding and decline to follow it .... It
is quite true as the Ninth Circuit points out.., that the United
States has plenary control over the criminal jurisdiction of tribal
courts. That does not answer the question. While Congress might
deprive the tribal courts of all of their residual jurisdiction to try
offenses not punishable under § 1153, it has not seen fit to do so."
The Eighth Circuit then proceeded to hold that "a tribal court in
administering its residual jurisdiction is not acting as an ad-
judicatory arm of the federal government and that it is not.., an
inferior court in the federal judicial system."
INDIAN LANDS: Establishment of a Prima Facie Case Under the
Nonintercourse Act
Oneida Indian Nation of New York State v. Oneida County, 434
F' Supp. 527 (1977): In order to establish a prima facie case under
the Nonintercourse Act, plaintiff must show that it is or represents
an Indian tribe within the meaning of the Act, that the parcels of
land at issue are covered by the Act as tribal land, that the United
States has never consented to the alienation of the tribal land, and
that the trust relationship between the United States and the tribe,
which was established by coverage of the Act, has never been ter-
minated or abandoned.
TAXATION: Federal Income Tax
In Fry v. United States, No. 76-1779 (9th Cir., June 22, 1977),
Lawrence and Nellie Fry, members of the Confederated Tribes of
the Colville Reservation, appealed from a United States district
court summary judgment holding that their income, derived from
logging operations on tribal land, is not exempt from federal in-
come taxation. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the grounds that (1)
Indians, like other United States citizens, are subject to federal in-
come taxation unless exempted by treaty or statute, (2) appellants
failed to point to any treaty or statute which exempts their ac-
tivities on the tribal lands from federal taxation, and (3) ap-
pellants' income is not derived "directly" from tribal lands, but
rather is derived from an employment contract between them and
the non-Indian lumber company that contracted with the tribe to
cut timber on the unallotted lands.
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The tribe contracted with Kettle Falls Lumber Company, a non-
Indian concern, to cut timber from unallotted lands of the reserva-
tion. Subsequently, Lawrence Fry was hired by Kettle Falls as a
logging subcontractor. There was no privity of contract between
Fry and the tribe. Appellants acknowledge the established law that
Indians, unless exempted by treaty or statute, are subject to
federal income taxation in the same manner as are other United
States citizens. They conceded that they could not point to a
statutory or treaty exemption which would specifically apply to
them or their activities. They base their claim on an analogy to the
exemption found in the General Allotment Act of 1887 and the
construction of such exemption as found in Squire v. Capoeman
[351 U.S. 1 (1956)]. This case held that because the Act "evinces a
congressional intent to subject an Indian Allotment to all taxes on-
ly after a patent in fee is issued to the allottee," and because "the
exemption accorded tribal and restricted Indian lands extends to
the income derived directly therefrom," the income realized by a
noncompetent Indian allottee from the sale of timber taken from
his trust-allotted land was exempt from federal capital gains tax.
Proceeding on this foundation, the appellants contended that
because the income the tribe directly derives from the logging
operation on tax-exempt land is exempt from federal income taxa-
tion, the income of appellants as members of the tribe should also
be shielded.
The court held this argument to be without merit on the follow-
ing grounds: (1) The exemption construed in Squire v. Capoeman
was intended to provide the allottee with unencumbered land
when he became competent. It was not to benefit him simply
because he was an Indian or to benefit Indians generally. (2) The
appellants failed to point to any treaty or statute by which the
tribe acquired tax-exempt status on the lands in question, but
assuming arguendo that such tax-exempt status did exist, ap-
pellants' income did not derive "directly" from those lands.
Although income to the tribe from the logging operation derives
directly from its ownership of the lands and trees thereon, ap-
pellants' income derives from the contract between Lawrence Fry
and Kettle Falls Lumber Company for the logging of timber. (3)
The category of tax-exempt income based on tax-exempt land is
concerned with land held by the taxpayer. The Eighth Circuit has
held that even if income derived from tribal land may be tax-
exempt to the tribe itself, the income a noncompetent Indian
derives from operations conducted on such lands is not tax-
exempt [Holt v. C.I.R., 386 U.S. 931 (1967). See also Strom v.
C.I.R., 158 F.2d 520 (1947)].
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